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Abstract
This paper argues that hydrocarbons producers with high rents per capita constitute a 
specific category in the broader universe of rent-dependent countries, facing a specific set 
of development challenges that are not shared by mid-rent countries (MRCs). The paper 
surveys patterns of rent distribution in high-rent countries (HRCs), focusing on energy sub-
sidies and excessive public employment, and analyses their developmental consequences. 
It then proposes unconditional cash grants for HRC citizens in combination with energy 
subsidy and public employment reform as a mitigation strategy to minimise HRC-specific 
negative effects of rent distribution.
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Introduction
The discussion on the ‘resource curse’ has increasingly moved into the terrain of policy 
prescriptions. One of the most prominent proposals for avoiding some of the pathologies 
that natural resource wealth can engender is the direct distribution of resource rents to 
the population.
This paper seeks to add to the growing literature on cash grants in rentier states by focusing 
on their potential impact in a particular class of resource-rich states in the developing world: 
countries with very high per capita resource rents, which are starting to be recognised as a 
category of their own, with their own political and economic development challenges.1
Such high-rent countries (HRCs) – a limited number of mostly small-population resource 
exporters in the developing world – face somewhat different challenges from the mid-rent 
countries (MRCs) on which much of the resource curse debate has traditionally focused, 
yet challenges that are in many ways as daunting. These have never been systematically 
analysed, and are surveyed in the first half of this paper. The second half of the paper then 
makes a case that direct cash grants are a potent remedy for most of them. As we will see, 
the case for such a ‘citizens’ income’ is even stronger for HRCs than for MRCs: while retain-
ing most of the redeeming features that cash grants are argued to have in the rentier state 
universe at large, citizens’ incomes would be easier to finance and justify, involve less acute 
trade-offs and, most importantly, help overcome HRC-specific development challenges.
To anticipate the paper’s main arguments, economies of HRCs typically distribute oil rents 
among their populations through two channels that create large inequities and distortions:
• very low domestic energy prices, which privilege wealthy consumers and lead to 
over-consumption, distorted investment decisions, declining energy efficiency and 
reduced long-term resource export capacity; and
• over-employment in the public sector, a similarly costly and unfair way of shar-
ing the wealth, which distorts labour markets by drawing nationals out of private 
employment. This effect is typically magnified by migration regimes that allow or 
tolerate large-scale imports of cheap foreign labour for private employment, re-
sulting in low labour productivity.
While the first mechanism of distribution is widespread among rentier countries in general, 
the latter is more specific to HRCs in its scale and scope. It undermines citizens’ interest 
in privately driven economic development and creates a potential zero-sum distributional 
conflict with local capitalists.
Most, though not all, HRCs have achieved reasonable levels of human development. This 
has happened, however, almost exclusively on the back of state spending. In the absence 
of privately driven economic diversification, HRCs’ long-term development challenges 
1  Justin Gengler, Group Conflict and Political Mobilization in Bahrain and the Arab Gulf: Rethinking the 
Rentier State (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2015). Michael Herb, ‘A Nation of Bureaucrats: 
Political Participation and Economic Diversification in Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates’, Inter-
national Journal of Middle East Studies 41/3 (2009), pp. 375–95. Terry Lynn Karl, The Paradox of Plenty: 
Oil Booms and Petro-States (Berkeley, CA, 1997), p. 11.
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are even more acute than those of MRCs: their dependency on cheap domestic energy, 
rent-financed public employment, transfers and services is even greater, and has deepened 
rather than lessened over time.
A citizens’ income could help move HRCs onto a more sustainable path in several ways. It 
would be a more incentive-neutral, transparent, fair and efficient way of sharing the nation’s 
wealth, and act as potent political justification for increasing domestic energy prices and 
reducing public sector recruitment. It would allow nationals to ‘top up’ modest private sector 
earnings so as to reach an acceptable overall income without creating some of the disincen-
tives to work that means-tested social security provisions create. Basic income security would 
allow citizens to compete with migrant labour and enable the former to upgrade their skills 
and take risks as entrepreneurs. The larger number of citizens that would hence be active in 
the private economy would create a political constituency for private-driven growth.
A citizens’ income could be financed through subsidy reductions, reduced public sector 
hiring and, in the long run, a permanent dividend on HRCs’ overseas investments. It 
would create none of the fiscal trade-offs, economic disincentives and moral problems 
that bedevil the basic income concept in tax-based economies, where the discussion about 
unconditional cash grants originated.
This paper contributes to several literatures: the resource curse and rentier state debates, 
the debate about subsidy reform in the developing world, and, finally, the broader literature 
on the ‘basic income’ concept that extends beyond politics, development and economics 
into political philosophy and whose useful insights – and caveats – are often ignored in the 
rentier cash grants discussion.
Selection of Cases
Any cut-off point to define high-rent status is arbitrary: ‘HRC’ is not a discrete empirical 
category but rather an ideal type which countries tend to approach as their per capita 
rents increase. To select cases for the empirical illustrations in this paper, a threshold 
of USD 3,000 per year has been chosen, resulting in the 11 countries shown in Figure 1. 
This does not mean that this paper’s arguments do not apply in weaker form to countries 
below this threshold.
Every effort has been made to collect comprehensive labour market, subsidy and mac-
ro-economic data on all 11 cases, but for Gabon and Equatorial Guinea in particular, 
information is patchy and contradictory. 
To situate HRCs in the wider rentier universe, we occasionally include MRCs with rents 
between USD 500 and 3,000 in this paper. In 2011, 13 non-OECD cases fell into this cat-
egory: Algeria, Angola, Azerbaijan, Congo-Brazzaville, Ecuador, Iran, Iraq, Kazakhstan, 
Malaysia, Russia, Syria, Turkmenistan and Venezuela.
8 Rent Distribution, Labour Markets and Development in High Rent Countries
Figure 1. Developing Countries with Per Capita Oil and Gas Rents above USD 3,000, 
2010. 
Source: Based on 2013 World Development Indicators data.
Current Outcomes in Rentier States
With the potential exception of Equatorial Guinea, all HRC regimes appear to feel a polit-
ical need to share their resource wealth with the wider population. The way this is done, 
however – with cheap energy and public sector over-employment playing a leading role2 
– is uniquely inefficient.
While these forms of distribution might have been justifiable at times of lower international 
energy prices and low domestic consumption, and when populations were smaller and 
state apparatuses just being built, they have now become extremely costly. Cheap energy 
and excessive public employment are inefficient, regressive and often exclusive tools of 
distribution, with deleterious consequences for non-oil diversification, fiscal sustainability 
and, in the long run, the potential of local societies to find a growth-oriented compromise 
between national workers and business.
2  There are of course many other forms of rent distribution, including free or subsidised public 
services, non-salary transfers (including pensions), preferential contracts for local business etc. Their 
scale is relatively small, however, and they are often less distortionary, have fewer negative external-
ities and are harder to compare across countries.
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Energy Subsidies
Energy subsidies in the developing world have been widely discussed in recent years.3 Cheap 
energy is typically provided through transport fuel, gas and electricity that are sold at far 
below international market prices.4 The available literature demonstrates convincingly that 
distribution of rents through cheap energy is regressive: according to International Mon-
etary Fund (IMF) estimates, the richest quintile of households in developing countries 
capture six times more in fuel subsidies (43 percent) than the poorest quintile.5 Unlike 
subsidised public services such as health and education, energy consumption also entails 
negative environmental externalities.
The size of implicit subsidies can be tricky to estimate: not all types of energy are easily 
exportable, and it is not clear whether all of the potentially ‘liberated’ energy produc-
tion could be exported without pushing international prices downwards.6 But even under 
restrictive assumptions, subsidies are very substantial for most of the countries being 
studied, and their regressive distributional impact and negative externalities obtain inde-
pendence from their direct fiscal opportunity cost. For the purposes of this paper, we will 
use the IMF’s 2011 energy subsidy estimates, which are comparable across countries (see 
Figure 2). They show that, with the exception of Gabon and Equatorial Guinea,7 our cases 
lie far above the global average of 0.7 percent of GDP. MRCs also have substantial, but for 
the most part lower, energy subsidies.8
3  Taimur Baig, Amine Mati, David Coady and Joseph Ntamatungiro, ‘Domestic Petroleum Prod-
uct Prices and Subsidies: Recent Developments and Reform Strategies’, IMF Country Report 07/71 
(2007). Available at https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2007/wp0771.pdf (accessed 13 October 
2015). Joseph Charap, Arthur Ribeiro da Silva and Pedro Rodriguez, ‘Energy Subsidies and Energy 
Consumption: A Cross-Country Analysis’, IMF Working Paper 13/112 (2013). Available at https://www.
imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2013/wp13112.pdf (accessed 13 October 2015). Benedict Clements et al., 
‘Case Studies on Energy Subsidy Reform: Lessons and Implications’, International Monetary Fund, 
28 January 2013. Available at http://www.imf.org/external/np/pp/eng/2013/012813a.pdf (accessed 13 
October 2015). Glada Lahn and Paul Stevens, ‘Burning Oil to Keep Cool: The Hidden Energy Crisis 
in Saudi Arabia’, Chatham House Programme Report, December 2011. Available at http://www.chatham-
house.org/publications/papers/view/180825 (accessed 13 October 2015).
4  Average diesel and gasoline prices in HRCs, e.g., were less than half of the US benchmark price 
in 2010; if Gabon is left out, average prices were about a third. See Gesellschaft für Internationale 
Zusammenarbeit, International Fuel Prices 2010/2011 (2012). Electricity and natural gas prices in some 
cases are even lower. See Jim Krane, Stability versus Sustainability: Energy Policy in the Gulf Monarchies, 
PhD dissertation, (Judge Business School, Cambridge University, 2013).
5  Energy Subsidy Reform: Lessons and Implications, International Monetary Fund (2013), p. 19.
6  Giacomo Luciani, ‘Domestic Pricing of Energy and Industrial Competitiveness’, in Giacomo 
Luciani (ed), Resources Blessed: Diversification and the Gulf Development Model (2012).
7  As recently as 2006, Gabon’s fuel subsidies alone were estimated at 2 percent of GDP; see Moataz 
El-Said and Daniel Leigh, ‘Fuel Price Subsidies in Gabon: Fiscal Cost and Distributional Impact’, 
IMF Working Paper 06/243 (2006). Available at https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/cat/longres.aspx-
?sk=19906.0 (accessed 13 October 2015). The more recent estimates seem to reflect subsequent 
pricing reforms.
8  The median subsidy estimate is 5.7 percent of GDP for HRCs and 3.8 percent for MRCs. Absolute 
per capita values, however, are seven times lower in low-rent countries (LRCs), which are consider-
ably poorer.
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Figure 2. Pre-Tax Subsidies for Petroleum Products, Electricity, Gas and Coal, 2011 
(percentage of GDP). 
Source: Based on IMF, Energy Subsidy Reform.
We do not have a reliable breakdown for energy consumption in the hydrocarbons and 
non-hydrocarbons sectors. Typically, however, the former uses only a small fraction of 
total energy, although it constitutes half or more of GDPs in our cases. This means that the 
energy subsidies in the non-hydrocarbons economy are even higher. They are even higher 
relative to a counterfactual in which environmental externalities and foregone tax reve-
nue are considered.9 Whatever measure for subsidies is used, their share in government 
revenue is typically more than twice as high as that in (total) GDP, reflecting enormous 
foregone revenue.
Over the last three decades, domestic energy consumption has increased above population 
growth and, in most cases, above GDP growth (see Table 1, and Figures 5 and 6 below). 
In 2010, average per capita energy consumption in our cases was 1.5 times the average of 
the world’s high-income countries.10 Anecdotally, much consumption is frivolous, caused 
by bad insulation, inefficient equipment and gas-guzzling vehicles that are incentivised by 
low prices, hence adding little to citizens’ welfare.
9  IMF, Energy Subsidy Reform.
10 Based on World Development Indicators; no data were available for Equatorial Guinea.
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Table 1. Compound Annual Growth Rates of Domestic Energy Consumption and 
Real GDP, 1980–2010. 
Source: Based on EIA, IMF and World Bank data.
Country Energy (%) GDP (%)
Bahrain 4.8 4.3
Brunei 2.0 0.6
Equatorial Guinea 15.8 16.5
Gabon 1.6 1.9
Kuwait 3.3 2.0
Libya 2.5 0
Oman 9.0 6.1
Qatar 5.6 5.8
Saudi Arabia 5.3 1.8
Trinidad and Tobago 5.8 2.1
UAE 9.0 3.2
In some cases, most notably Saudi Arabia, growing domestic consumption has started 
to threaten countries’ hydrocarbons export capacity, further reducing potential govern-
ment revenue.11
Labour Market Outcomes
Over-employment of citizens in the public sector under generous conditions is the second 
main channel of mass rent circulation that all our HRCs bar Equatorial Guinea have 
engaged in, and it is the distribution tool that truly sets them apart from other rentiers. 
Combined with large-scale labour migration (see Figure 3), government job guarantees 
typically result in a large public sector dominated by nationals, and a private sector with a 
strong or dominant presence of foreign workers (see Figure 4). Only Trinidad and Tobago 
forms an exception to the migrant dependence pattern, possibly as a result of its domestic 
tradition of low-wage plantation labour.
11  Krane, Stability. Lahn and Stevens, Burning Oil.
12 Rent Distribution, Labour Markets and Development in High Rent Countries
Figure 3. Hydrocarbons Rent Per Capita vs. Migrant Population, 2010. 
Source: Based on World Bank Development Indicators data.12
For the HRC nine cases on which we have data, there is an average of more than two 
nationals employed in the public sector per privately employed national. This compares to 
a typical ratio of one public employee to four or five private employees in both developed 
and developing countries.13 A citizen’s odds of being publicly employed are hence some ten 
times higher in HRCs than elsewhere. HRCs also appear to be outliers within the rentier 
universe: in the five MRCs on which the International Labour Organization holds data, 
public employees never constitute more than a third of total employment.
12 The World Bank’s figure for the second apparent HRC outlier, Equatorial Guinea (EQG), is proba-
bly wrong, as press reports indicate a large migrant presence amounting to one third of the population. 
See ‘Equatorial Guinea: Oil Money Draws Sub-Saharan Africans’, IRINnews, 22 October 2008. Available 
at http://www.irinnews.org/Report/81046/EQUATORIAL-GUINEA-Oil-money-draws-sub-Saharan-Af-
ricans (accessed 13 October 2015). The UAE figure also appears much too low, as official and 
international sources indicate a migrant stock of above 80 percent of the population.
13  Messaoud Hammouya, Statistics on Public Sector Employment: Methodology, Structures and Trends 
(Geneva, 1999).
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Figure 4. Labour Market Structures, 2009 Unless Marked Otherwise. 
Sources: Based on national authorities, World Bank and IMF data.14
There is much anecdotal evidence of over-employment and bloated bureaucracies in 
HRCs, as job creation is typically driven by the need to provide jobs for new labour market 
entrants rather than by administrative needs. Administrations often perform poorly due to 
overstaffing and weak incentive systems.15
A survey of the available primary and secondary sources shows that HRC public sectors 
also typically pay much higher salaries, offer more perks, provide higher job security and 
extract less performance than private employers do. The pattern is strikingly uniform 
across cases.16
14 No labour market data were available for Equatorial Guinea; unlike those of other HRCs, its 
public sector appears to be rather small as most rents are siphoned off by corrupt political elites. See 
G. Wood, ‘Business and Politics in a Criminal State: The Case of Equatorial Guinea’, African Affairs 
103/413 (2004), pp. 547–67.
15  Abdul Rahman Al Ageli, ‘Youth Employment in Libya’, Libya Herald, 16 December 2013. Available 
at http://www.libyaherald.com/2012/12/16/youth-employment-in-libya-a-structural-solution-is-need-
ed-part-23 (accessed 13 October 2015). Christopher Colclough and Martin Godfrey, ‘The Economics 
of Labour Shortage: Three Case Studies from Northern Borneo’, IDS Bulletin 17/4 (1986), pp. 1–9. 
Ugo Fasano and Rishi Goyal, ‘Emerging Strains in GCC Labour Markets’, IMF Working Paper 04/71. 
Available at https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/cat/longres.aspx?sk=17286.0 (accessed 13 October 
2015). Ingo Forstenlechner and Emilie Rutledge, ‘Unemployment in the Gulf: Time to Update the 
“Social Contract”’, Middle East Policy 17/2 (2010), pp. 38–51. Steffen Hertog, ‘A Comparative Assess-
ment of Labour Market Nationalization Policies in the GCC’, in Steffen Hertog (ed), Labour Market, 
Unemployment, and Migration in the GCC (Geneva, 2011). Richard Shediac and Hatem Samman, Meet-
ing the Employment Challenge in the GCC (Dubai, 2010).
16  Martin Baldwin-Edwards, ‘Labour Immigration and Labour Markets in the GCC Countries: 
National Patterns and Trends’, LSE Kuwait Programme Paper Series 15 (London, 2011). Forstenlech-
ner and Rutledge, ‘Unemployment’. Hertog, ‘Comparative Assessment’. Lim Hong-Huat, ‘Economic 
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Unlike those of developed economies, public sectors in HRCs typically act as wage-setters for 
nationals,17 shaping their general expectations regarding salaries and work conditions. Pri-
vate sector wages in all but the highest-skilled categories, however, are typically low and work 
conditions comparatively harsh due to the preponderance of migrant workers there. The 
low-skilled foreigners who satisfy most of the private labour demand enjoy limited formal 
rights, including lower job security than nationals and low or no labour market mobility, 
allowing for significant rent extraction by employers, who often employ them informally.18
As a result, most citizens evince a pronounced preference for public sector employment 
and many are happy to queue for positions in the overstaffed bureaucracy, preferring 
unemployment to private sector jobs.19 Conversely, private employers prefer foreigners.
The ironic result of government attempts to create public jobs for everyone is low labour 
market participation among nationals in most HRCs as well as high citizen unemployment 
in all but the highest-rent countries. Nationals’ labour market participation in the four 
highest-rent Gulf monarchies ranges from 36 to 51 percent;20 (total) participation ratios 
reach 61 percent in Trinidad and Tobago,21 60 percent in Gabon and 53 percent in Libya.22 
This compares with a world average of 69 percent.23
Crisis, Unemployment and Training in Brunei Darussalam’, presented at the APEC Forum on 
Human Resources Development, Chiba, Japan, 18–20 November 2009. ‘Gabon: 2012 IMF Article 
IV Consultation’, IMF Country Report 13/55 (March 2013), p. 15. Ralph Chami et al., Libya beyond the 
Revolution: Challenges and Opportunities, International Monetary Fund Middle East and Central Asia Depart-
ment (Washington, DC, 2012), p. 11. Reshma Mahabir, Vishana Jagessar, Crystal Neptune and Delvin 
Cox, ‘Understanding Wages in a Small Open Economy: The Case of Trinidad and Tobago’, Central 
Bank of Trinidad and Tobago Working Paper 11/2013 (February 2013), pp. 8–9.
17  Colclough and Godfrey, ‘Economics’. Andrew Downes, ‘An Economic Analysis of Unemployment 
in Trinidad and Tobago’, SSRN Scholarly Paper 1817180 (Rochester, NY, 1998), p. 16. Available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=1817180 (accessed 13 October 2015). ‘Brunei Darussalam: Recent 
Economic Developments’, IMF Country Report 99/19 (April 1999), p. 33.
18  Ingo Forstenlechner and Emilie Jane Rutledge, ‘The GCC’s ‘Demographic Imbalance’: Per-
ceptions, Realities and Policy Options’, Middle East Policy 18/4 (2011), pp. 25–43. Geoffrey Gunn, 
‘Rentier Capitalism in Negara Brunei Darussalam’, in Kelvin Hewison, Richard Robison and Garry 
Rodan (eds), Southeast Asia in the 1990s: Authoritarianism, Democracy and Capitalism (St Leonards, 1993). 
Raimundo Soto and Rosalía Vasquez-Alvarez, ‘The Efficiency Cost of the Kafala in Dubai: A Sto-
chastic Frontier Analysis’, Instituto de Economia, Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile, Documentos de 
Trabajo 399. Available at http://ideas.repec.org/p/ioe/doctra/399.html (accessed 13 October 2015). 
John Willoughby, ‘Ambivalent Anxieties of the South Asian–Gulf Arab Labour Exchange’, Revista de 
Economia Mundial 14 (2006), pp. 31–56. Wood, ‘Business’.
19  Forstenlechner and Rutledge, ‘Unemployment’. Gunn, ‘Rentier Capitalism’, p. 115. Hong-Huat, 
‘Economic Crisis’. Monitor Group and Cambridge Energy Research Associates, National Economic 
Strategy: An Assessment of the Competitiveness of the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya (Tripoli, 2006), p. 135. Douglas 
Yates, ‘Neo-‘Petro-Monialism’ and the Rentier State in Gabon’, in Matthias Basedau and Andreas 
Mehler (eds), Resource Politics in Sub-Saharan Africa (Hamburg, 2005), p. 187.
20  Baldwin-Edwards, Labour Immigration, p. 13.
21  Mahabir et al., Understanding Wages, p. 5.
22  World Development Indicators.
23  For research linking low female labour market participation in particular to oil income, see 
Michael L. Ross, ‘Oil, Islam, and Women’, American Political Science Review 102/1 (2008), pp. 107–23.
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Citizen unemployment statistics are unreliable and contested, but available estimates for 
most HRCs are high: 12 percent in Saudi Arabia in 2013, 24 percent in Oman in 2010, 
27 percent in Gabon in 2012, and 26 percent in Libya in 2010.24 Only in Brunei, Kuwait, 
Qatar and the UAE is citizen unemployment in single digits, as there are sufficient surplus 
government jobs at least for male citizens, while in Trinidad and Tobago sufficient num-
bers of nationals work in low-wage sectors like tourism and agriculture to have reduced 
unemployment to around 5 percent in 2011 (down from 20 percent in the late 1980s).25
Most HRC nationals shun productive economic activities in their own countries. In many 
HRCs, there are quota-based attempts to increase nationals’ private employment levels, 
which most employers, whose incentives are stacked against employing demanding locals, 
evade with relative ease.26
There are huge direct and indirect costs to surplus public employment. A large, usually 
dominant share of potentially productive national manpower is ‘parked’ in jobs whose eco-
nomic contribution is questionable. Public sector employment policies give questionable 
education incentives, leading to an undersupply of national skills relevant in the private 
market.27 Public sector over-employment also creates large, unnecessary overhead costs 
and negative environmental and infrastructure externalities.28 It is also an inequitable way 
of sharing the wealth: quite apart from micro-level issues of favouritism and unequal pay 
scales, even in the richest HRCs a significant – usually young and/or female – segment of 
the population remains structurally excluded from this form of rent distribution, as public 
employment policies favour older, male job seekers.
Migrant dependence and labour-intensive growth have also led to very high population 
growth rates, requiring additional infrastructure investment: from 1990 to 2010, HRC 
populations grew an average of 110 percent, compared to 30 percent worldwide popula-
tion growth and 60 percent growth in low-income countries.29
24  Saudi Arabia: Central Department of Statistics, Manpower Research Bulletin 2013-1 (Riyadh, 2013). 
Saleh Al-Shaibany, ‘Choosy Omanis Add to Government’s Unemployment Headache’, Reuters, 14 
September 2012, citing the IMF. Available at http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/09/14/us-oman-
jobs-idUSBRE88D15820120914 (accessed 13 October 2015). Dominique Puthod, Mouhamadou Sy 
and Bakary Dosso, ‘Gabon 2015’, African Economic Outlook, 2015. Available at http://www.africaneco-
nomicoutlook.org/en/countries/central-africa/gabon (accessed 13 October 2015). Ralph Chami et al., 
Libya beyond the Revolution.
25  Mahabir et al., Understanding Wages, p. 3.
26  African Development Bank, ‘Equatorial Guinea’,  African Development Bank, African Economic Out-
look (Tunis, 2008), p. 296. Laura El-Katiri, Bassam Fattouh and Paul Segal, ‘Anatomy of an Oil-Based 
Welfare State: Rent Distribution in Kuwait’, LSE Kuwait Programme Paper Series 13 (London, 2011). 
Forstenlechner and Rutledge, ‘Unemployment’. ‘Gabon Oil Workers Strike over Foreign Workers’, 
BBC News, 15 April 2010. Available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/africa/8622688.stm (accessed 
13 October 2015). Hertog, ‘Comparative Assessment’.
27  Hertog, ‘Comparative Assessment’.
28  Karl Widerquist and Michael A. Lewis, The Basic Income Guarantee and the Goals of Equality, Effi-
ciency, and Environmentalism (New York, 2009). Available at http://works.bepress.com/widerquist/17 
(accessed 13 October 2015).
29  World Development Indicators.
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Economic Development Outcomes
The skewed energy and labour market structures described above seem to have led to 
large macro-economic distortions: descriptive statistics and simple econometrics show that 
energy efficiency and labour productivity have strongly declined over the last few decades 
for most HRC cases – a result that does not obtain for MRCs, where, at least per capita, 
subsidies are much lower.30
Figure 5 demonstrates that while economies across the world have become more energy 
efficient over the last three decades, energy intensity of production has strongly increased 
in HRCs, a result that must at least in part be explained by low domestic energy prices.31
Figure 5. Energy Use (Kg of Oil Equivalent) Per USD 1,000 GDP (constant 2005 PPP). 
Source: Based on World Bank Development Indicators data.32
30  Based on World Development Indicators; no data were available for Equatorial Guinea.
31  The improvement in energy efficiency in MRCs from the mid-1990s is partially, but not wholly, 
driven by former Soviet republics.
32 Equatorial Guinea, Qatar and Libya are not included in the calculation, as no data are available 
for most years.
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Relative to the rest of the world, HRC energy intensity has increased by 150 percent since 
1980. Saudi Arabia is now using as much energy as the UK, a country with more than twice 
the Saudi population and 3.6 times its GDP. As Figure 6 shows, this result is not driven by 
individual HRCs.
Figure 6. Rents Per Capita and Shifts in Energy Intensity, 1980–2010. 
Source: Based on World Development Indicators data.
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The relationship disappears if HRCs are excluded from the comparison (Figure 7). Con-
versely, it continues to hold even if the sample is limited to non-OECD countries and/or 
only rentier countries above USD 500 per capita rents.
Figure 7. Rents Per Capita and Shifts in Energy Intensity without HRCs, since 1980. 
Source: Based on World Development Indicators data.
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Figure 8 shows a similar trend over time with regard to labour productivity, where incen-
tives in HRCs are similarly skewed due to the availability of low-cost foreign workers and 
the limited availability of skilled national labour for productive employment.33
Figure 8. Output Per Member of the Labour Force (constant 2005 USD; 1994 = 1). 
Source: Based on World Development Indicators data.
Note: Mid-income countries are standardised at 1 in 1993 due to lack of earlier data. Note that the graph does not 
measure labour productivity strictly speaking, as the unemployed are not taken out of the labour force due to a lack of 
reliable time series data on unemployment in HRCs. It is unlikely, however, that unemployment levels shifted so strongly, 
and differentially over time in different country groups as to affect relative orders of magnitude.
33  Growth results are not discussed here, as in HRCs even the growth patterns of non-oil sectors are 
too strongly influenced by oil price developments and hence very dependent on the time window 
chosen for longitudinal comparisons.
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As Figure 9 shows, there is a statistically significant relationship between rents per capita 
and the shift in labour productivity from 1990 to 2010.34
Figure 9. Shifts in Labour Productivity and Rents per Capita, 1990–2010. 
Source: Based on World Development Indicators data.35
In line with our expectations, the one non-migrant economy among our HRCs, Trinidad and 
Tobago, was the only one to witness any substantial improvements in productivity,36 while 
also maintaining relatively high citizen labour market participation and low unemployment.
34  The earliest year for which time series data are available for most countries is 1990. All countries 
whose productivity time series started before 2001 were also included (with productivity data from 
the earliest available year used in the denominator). This, if anything, flattened trends over time; the 
omission of such cases did not materially change results. Equatorial Guinea was left out of the esti-
mates as data indicated a 15-fold increase in productivity, which, given the country’s widely reported 
development failures, appears highly implausible.
35 The change in labour productivity is measured in log terms to make sure that increases and 
decreases are measured on the same scale. Statistical tests (see Table 2) yield essentially the same 
results if change is measured in percentage terms.
36  See also ‘Trinidad and Tobago: 2006 Article IV Consultation – Staff Report’, IMF Country Report 
07/10 (Washington, DC, 2007), p. 20.
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Again, as Figure 10 shows, the correlation disappears when HRCs are taken out of the sam-
ple.37 And conversely, the relationship once more persists even if only countries with rents 
above USD 500 per capita are included and/or OECD states are excluded.
Figure 10. Shifts in Labour Productivity and Rents per Capita without HRCs, 
1990–2010. 
Source: Based on World Development Indicators data.
Some simple cross-sectional OLS (ordinary least squares) regressions give us further con-
fidence in the robustness of the relationship and provide additional hints as to the causal 
processes at work (data are insufficient for a full panel specification that could allow more 
conclusive tests).
Table 2 shows that hydrocarbon rents per capita are a significant and substantial predictor 
of a decline in productivity from 1990 to 2010. In the simplest model, an additional USD 
1,000 of rents implies a productivity loss of about 2.6 percent (column 1). For a country 
with per capita rents of USD 10,000 (which Oman, Saudi Arabia and Equatorial Guinea are 
close to), the predicted loss amounts to 22 percent; for a country with rents of USD 20,000 
(less than Qatar and Kuwait had in 2010), it reaches 40 percent (as the dependent variable 
is logged, the percentage effect is not scale-invariant).
Just like growth, labour productivity in standard macro-economic models is influenced by a 
37  Gengler, Group Conflict, points to a similar phenomenon regarding the widespread regressions of 
democracy scores over levels of rent.
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number of structural variables, most importantly an economy’s capital stock and the quality 
of its human resources.38 Rents per capita could be correlated with either, and hence both 
need to be controlled for. The inclusion of gross fixed capital formation as a control vari-
able does indeed much improve the fit of the model, but hardly changes the effect of rents 
(column 2). The rent effect also survives the addition of the average secondary enrolment 
ratio from 1990–2010 as a control variable, which can be taken as a rough measure of the 
citizen population’s skill level (column 3).
Rents only become insignificant when the share of migrants in the population is added 
to the model, tentative evidence that an important causal mechanism linking rents and 
productivity losses might indeed be the dominance of low-skilled foreigners in the private 
labour market (column 4).39 As we would expect, the share of migrants itself has a (weakly) 
significant negative effect on productivity in model 4, which just about slips into insignifi-
cance if secondary enrolment is included as a control variable, resulting in the loss of 16 
observations (column 5).40 None of the significant effects of rents in Table 2 obtain if HRCs 
are left out of the model.
38  For a classical theoretical and empirical statement on determinants of growth, see N. Gregory 
Mankiw, David Romer and David N. Weil, ‘A Contribution to the Empirics of Economic Growth’, 
Quarterly Journal of Economics 107/2 (1992), pp. 407–37.
39  Including the share of individuals with secondary education in the labour force as a control vari-
able has a similar effect to the inclusion of migrants, which is likely to be the case because in HRCs 
the composition of the labour force (as opposed to school-age enrolment ratios) is strongly impacted 
by the presence of migrants. This argument is also made by Gassan Al-Kibsi, Claus Benkert and Jörg 
Schubert, ‘Getting Labour Policy to Work in the GCC’, McKinsey Quarterly, special edition (2007), pp. 
19–22; also by ‘Labour Market Reforms to Boost Employment and Productivity in the GCC’, Interna-
tional Monetary Fund. Available at http://www.imf.org/external/np/pp/eng/2013/100513.pdf (accessed 
13 October 2015).
40  The results in models 1 and 2 survive a number of robustness tests such as the inclusion of an 
OECD dummy, that of an Arab world dummy, the omission of OECD cases and that of the UAE as an 
influential case; rents in model 3 become insignificant in some of the robustness tests, but the direc-
tion and size of the estimated effect remain similar. Rents also remain significant in models 1 and 2 
if they are estimated only for the 27 rentier states having per capita rents of at least USD 500, while 
capital formation ceases to be significant, indicating that returns to capital in rentier countries might 
be uniquely low. The latter effect is confirmed by a model that controls for the interaction of rents 
per capita with capital formation, which turns out to have a negative impact at p < .1 (while results 
for the individual rent, capital formation and migrants variables remain similar to those in column 
5). A similar model with an interaction term for rents and migration, by contrast, is not significant.
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Table 2. OLS Regressions with Change in Logged Labour Productivity 1990–2010 as 
a Dependent Variable.41
Model 1 2 3 4 5
Hydrocarbon rents per capita  
(USD ’000 in 2010)
−.026***
(0.001)
−.025***
(0.009)
−.021**
(0.009)
−.007
(0.013)
−.005
(0.013)
Gross fixed capital formation  
(percent of GDP, 1990–2010 average)
.038***
(.007)
.035***
(.009)
.037***
(.007)
035***
(.009)
Secondary enrolment ratio  
(percent, 1990–2010 average)
−.0006
(.001)
.000
(.001)
Migrants  
(percent of population in 2010)
−.007*
(.004)
−0.006
(.004)
Constant .259***
(.041)
−.566***
(.168)
−.474**
(.201)
−.523***
(.167)
−.487**
(.199)
Adjusted r-squared 0.063 0.2707 0.1974 0.289 0.2154
N 89 87 71 87 71
The above is suggestive rather than conclusive and does not provide clear-cut causal identifi-
cation. Even if the core link holds true, there could be other causal channels linking high rent 
levels to productivity declines (although there is no good evidence that the quality of insti-
tutions, one of the most prominent variables in the resource curse debate, is one of them).42
In descriptive terms, it is clear, however, that growth in HRCs has been factor-intensive, 
relying on rapidly growing inputs of energy and cheap labour, while witnessing declining 
productivity. While the national labour force is parked in the public sector, most of the 
work in the private sector is done by cheap, low-skilled and low-productivity migrant work-
ers.43 The available studies about total factor productivity – which is, roughly speaking, the 
efficiency at which inputs like capital and labour are utilised – also show it as stagnating or 
41 Standard errors are reported in parentheses. *, ** and *** indicate significance at the 90 percent, 
95 percent and 99 percent level, respectively.
42  Adding the World Bank’s ‘Country Policy and Institutional Assessment’ variable to models 1 or 2 
reduces the number of cases to 25; its coefficient is insignificant (as is that for rents, which, however, 
switches to positive in both cases). Perhaps more conclusively, the HRCs’ average score on the World 
Bank’s ‘Government Effectiveness’ indicator is 0, equivalent to the global average. The average score 
of the MRCs – which evince better productivity trends than the HRCs – is −0.7, two thirds of a stan-
dard deviation below the global average. Similar patterns apply for other measures of institutional 
quality. This indicates a potentially curvilinear relationship between rents and institutional quality 
which cannot explain the observed productivity trends.
43  For a general case that public sector over-employment can hamper economic growth, indepen-
dent of the role of migrant labour, see Alan Gelb, John B. Knight and Richard H. Sabot, ‘Public 
Sector Employment, Rent Seeking and Economic Growth’, Economic Journal 101 (1991), pp. 1186–99.
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falling in HRCs,44 including in the non-oil sector.45 While this might indicate optimal use of 
available, very cheap labour, it prevents the technology development, diversification and 
private employment of nationals that all HRCs aspire to in their development plans.
Large-scale employment of foreigners also results in a high share of labour remittances in 
non-hydrocarbons GDP (at an average of 12 percent),46 thereby reducing private demand 
generation in the domestic economy. The ratio of public to private consumption is on aver-
age twice as high in HRCs as in both MRCs and non-rentiers.47
Political Economy Ooutcomes
There is one more consequence of nationals’ weak presence in private employment: a weak 
interest on their part in privately driven economic development and a lack of shared inter-
ests with the capitalist class. While this cannot be proven with hard data, Michael Herb has 
illustrated this pattern convincingly in a paired comparison of economic policy in the UAE 
and Kuwait. Because few citizens in these countries are privately employed and business 
contributes almost no taxes that could finance public services, nationals have no ratio-
nal interest in a thriving private sector – which has led the Kuwaiti parliament to pursue 
populist public employment and subsidy policies consistently and undermine government 
attempts to support privately driven diversification. Pro-business policies in the UAE could 
only be pursued by an authoritarian leadership.48 
In HRCs – especially the very richest ones – citizens and capitalists face an unusually harsh 
zero-sum game in which both vie for a larger share of the distributional pie while having 
little of the shared interest in capitalist development that underpins compromise between 
classes in advanced economies.49 To the extent that citizens’ populist demands are fulfilled 
in the shape of excessive government employment, their incentives to acquire relevant skills 
and seek private employment are further undermined, in turn weakening their interest in 
private sector development. Business for its part demands and becomes more dependent 
on migrant workers, the consequences of which have been discussed above. The political 
economy of HRCs can create a self-reinforcing anti-development equilibrium.
The lack of shared class interests can undermine developmental policies particularly if 
regimes are sensitive to popular sentiment. In HRC cases where the private sector is weak 
44  ‘Gabon: Selected Issues and Statistical Appendix’, IMF Country Report 05/147 (Washington, DC, 
2005), p. 29. ‘Qatar: 2010 IMF Article IV Consultation – Staff Report’, IMF Country Report 11/64 
(Washington, DC, 2011), pp. 47f. ‘World Bank, Socialist People’s Libyan Arab Jamahiriya: Country 
Economic Report’, World Bank Social and Economic Development Group, Middle East and North Africa 
Region 30295-LY (July 2006), p. 29. Available at http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTLIBYA/
Resources/libyacountryeconomicreport.pdf (accessed 13 October 2015).
45  ‘Labour Market Reforms’, IMF.
46  Based on World Bank remittance data.
47  UNSTATS data.
48  Herb, ‘Nation of Bureaucrats’. Further evidence of populist anti-business sentiments among the 
citizens of Gulf monarchies is adduced by Steffen Hertog, ‘The Private Sector and Reform in the Gulf 
Cooperation Council’, LSE Kuwait Programme Paper Series 30 (London, 2013).
49  On ‘class compromise’ in mature capitalist countries see Adam Przeworski, Capitalism and Social 
Democracy (Cambridge, 1986).
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but public employment extensive – Libya, Brunei and to a lesser extent Gabon – there is 
less of a class conflict, but arguably little citizen interest in developing the private sector in 
the first place.
Summary
The above empirical sections have demonstrated that HRCs form a distinct class of 
resource-rich state. HRCs evince a fairly uniform pattern of costly and often inequita-
ble domestic rent distribution in the shape of cheap energy (as some other developing 
and rentier countries also do) and excessive public sector employment (on a scale unique 
to HRCs). Arguably as a result, HRC economies are characterised by strongly declining 
energy efficiency and – in combination with open labour migration regimes – declining 
labour productivity.
The inequity and negative externalities of the status quo should be a concern under all 
circumstances. Inefficient use of resources and lack of non-oil private-driven growth and 
development might not be an issue if HRC resources were infinite. They are not, however. 
There is no space for a discussion of fiscal breakeven prices of oil and gas here, but we know 
that they have increased rapidly for most HRCs in recent years – a pattern that is typically 
hard to reverse, especially when it involves entitlement spending – and HRCs might soon 
be eating into their reserves.50 Energy consumption and public employment costs typically 
have been rising considerably above population growth, a trend that could only be sus-
tained if energy prices continued increasing forever – an unlikely scenario.
As HRCs approach the limits of their fiscal capacities, inefficiency and rapid growth of 
resource consumption are becoming problematic. Insufficient investment into productive 
skills and assets as well as low levels of private demand generation mean that HRCs are 
ill-prepared for the time when state spending will have to plateau and shrink.
50  ‘Regional Economic Outlook: Middle East and Central Asia’, IMF (Washington, DC, 2012), p. 
93. ‘Middle East and North Africa: Defining the Road Ahead’, IMF Regional Economic Outlook Update: 
Middle East and Central Asia Department, May 2013. Available at http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/
ft/reo/2013/mcd/eng/pdf/mcdreo0513.pdf (accessed 13 October 2015). Paul Stevens and Matthew 
Hulbert, ‘Oil Prices: Energy Investment, Political Stability in the Exporting Countries and OPEC’s 
Dilemma’, EEDP Programme Paper 2012/03 (October 2012). Available at http://www.chathamhouse.
org/sites/default/files/public/Research/Energy,%20Environment%20and%20Development/1012pp_
opec.pdf (accessed 13 October 2015).
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The Challenge of Distribution and the Citizens’ Income Concept
Rent distribution in HRCs is a political fact; even the most authoritarian ruler would find 
it difficult to rescind his material obligations towards his subjects.51 Quite apart from polit-
ical exigency, the moral case for sharing national wealth with the population is cogent, 
as citizens are its rightful owners.52 The relevant policy question hence becomes how to 
reform distribution.
How should distribution be reorganised in an ideal world? Four basic criteria appear to be 
relevant. Rent recycling should:
• provide the largest and most widespread economic welfare for citizens;
• minimise distortive incentives regarding energy consumption, technology choice 
and productivity;
• help to integrate the citizenry into the national economy; and
• not undermine the long-term fiscal basis of the state.
This paper proposes a general and unconditional cash grant to all adult HRC citizens, 
combined with and financed through energy pricing and public employment reform, as 
the most appropriate means to achieve the above objectives. Although it will not by itself 
be able to fulfil all the above aims conclusively, it can achieve important improvements on 
all of them.
General Arguments for Cash Grants in Rentier States
There is a great deal of literature arguing for a tax-financed, unconditional basic income 
for citizens of advanced economies.53 The discussion here will initially focus on literature 
specific to rentier states; we will later draw on the general basic income literature when dis-
cussing cash grants’ specific implications for HRCs as well as potential objections to them.
There are real-world precedents for regular cash grants in a number of rentier economies, 
including Iran, Bolivia and Alaska.54 These experiences have been accompanied by a growing 
51  Only the regime in Equatorial Guinea seems to share remarkably little of its wealth with the wider 
population.
52  Paul Segal, ‘Resource Rents, Redistribution, and Halving Global Poverty: The Resource Divi-
dend’, World Development 39/4 (2011), pp. 475–89. Leif Wenar, ‘Property Rights and the Resource 
Curse’, Philosophy & Public Affairs 36/1 (2008), pp. 2–32. An unconditional basic income scheme has 
been supported as compensation for the infringement of common ownership rights more generally; 
see Philippe Van Parijs, ‘Competing Justifications of Basic Income’, in Philippe Van Parijs (ed.), 
Arguing for Basic Income (London, 1992). This argument is all the more pertinent in the rentier state 
context. For a global variant of resource-based cash grants, see Thomas W. Pogge, ‘An Egalitarian 
Law of Peoples’, Philosophy & Public Affairs 23/3 (1994), pp. 195–224.
53  For a concise statement see Philippe Van Parijs, ‘Basic Income: A Simple and Powerful Idea for 
the 21st Century’, presented at the Basic Income European Network VIIIth International Congress, 
Berlin, 6–7 October 2000.
54  Paul Segal, ‘How to Spend It: Resource Wealth and the Distribution of Resource Rents’, LSE 
Kuwait Programme Paper Series 18 (London, 2011). Hamid Tabatabai, ‘The “Basic Income” Road to 
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discussion about subsidy reform and cash grants for resource-rich economies in general, 
notably in the pages of World Development.55 The Center for Global Development is under-
taking a full research initiative on rent-financed cash grants in resource-rich states.56
There are numerous general arguments for rentier cash grants: compared to existing sub-
sidy systems that privilege insiders and rich households they are more equitable,57 less 
distortive of consumption decisions and more transparent.58 Compared to means-tested 
support systems, they are easier to administer, generate smaller overheads, and are less 
prone to stigmatisation and errors of exclusion.59
Cash grants could keep at least part of the state’s resource revenues out of the hands of self-in-
terested politicians, thereby reducing corruption.60 They could impart a sense of ownership 
to citizens, increasing their ‘buy in’ to the political system,61 and create both a constituency 
for sound natural resource management and a more level playing field between state and 
citizens.62 Pressures for fiscal transparency and accountability could increase, especially if 
cash grants are combined with the introduction of a broad-based tax system.63
By providing a secure revenue stream to citizens, cash grants could boost private invest-
ment, entrepreneurship and the development of local markets, including financial ones.64 
Authors in the cash grants literature – including the broader discussion on conditional 
cash grants in developing countries in general – have adduced considerable evidence that 
private agents are adept at investing their money well and at smoothing their consumption 
over time in case of windfalls.65
Reforming Iran’s Subsidy System’, presented at the 13th International Congress of the Basic Income 
Earth Network (BIEN), Universidade de São Paulo, São Paulo, Brazil, 30 June–2 July 2010.
55  Martin E. Sandbu, ‘Natural Wealth Accounts: A Proposal for Alleviating the Natural Resource 
Curse’, World Development 34/7 (2006), pp. 1153–70. Segal, ‘Resource Rents’.
56  Todd J. Moss, ‘Oil to Cash: Fighting the Resource Curse through Cash Transfers’, SSRN Schol-
arly Paper 1824605 (Rochester, NY, 2010). Available at http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=1824605 
(accessed 13 October 2015).
57  Sandbu, ‘Natural Wealth Accounts’.
58  Todd J. Moss, ‘Oil to Cash’.
59  Segal, ‘Resource Rents’.
60  César Baena, Benoît Sévi and Allan Warrack, ‘Funds from Non-Renewable Energy Resources: 
Policy Lessons from Alaska and Alberta’, Energy Policy 51 (2012), pp. 569–77. Nancy Birdsall and 
Arvind Subramanian, ‘Saving Iraq from its Oil’, Foreign Affairs (July/August 2004). Available at http://
www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/59923/nancy-birdsall-and-arvind-subramanian/saving-iraq-from-its-
oil (accessed 13 October 2015).
61  Thomas Palley, Combating the Natural Resource Curse with Citizen Revenue Distribution Funds: Oil and 
the Case of Iraq (Washington, DC, 2003).
62  Alan Gelb and Sina Grasmann, ‘How Should Oil Exporters Spend Their Rents?’, SSRN Schol-
arly Paper 1660570 (Rochester, NY, 2010). Available at http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=1660570 
(accessed 13 October 2015). Alexandra Gillies, ‘Giving Money Away? The Politics of Direct Distri-
bution in Resource Rich States’, SSRN Scholarly Paper 1824444 (Rochester, NY, 2010). Available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=1824444 (accessed 13 October 2015).
63  Sandbu, ‘Natural Wealth Accounts’. Segal, ‘Resource Rents’.
64  Gelb and Grasmann, How Should Oil Exporters Spend Their Rents?. Palley, Combating the Natural 
Resource Curse. Sandbu, ‘Natural Wealth Accounts’.
65  Birdsall and Subramanian, ‘Saving Iraq’. Alan Gelb and Stephanie Majerowicz, Oil for Uganda – or 
Ugandans? Can Cash Transfers Prevent the Resource Curse? (Washington, DC, 2012). Sandbu, ‘Natural 
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The above arguments generally also apply in the HRC context, although with some 
nuances: with the exception of Gabon and Equatorial Guinea, corruption is a less acute 
problem in HRCs than in MRCs;66 conversely, as we have seen above, the need to develop 
private markets (and employment) is arguably even larger. The main ambition of this 
paper, however, is not to scrutinise the validity of existing rentier cash grant arguments in 
detail, but to analyse such grants’ specific and additional implications for HRCs, which the 
following sections do.
Energy Consumption
The rationale and implications of providing a citizens’ income in lieu of energy subsidies 
are quite straightforward and to some extent already covered in the literature. We have seen 
that energy subsidies favour the rich and have particularly distortive economic effects in 
HRCs. The need to reform energy subsidies is widely accepted by now across the developing 
world, and substituting less distortive welfare measures, including cash grants, for cheap 
energy has become a standard policy recommendation.67 In fact, Iran introduced uncon-
ditional cash grants as compensation for higher energy prices from 2010 on. Although the 
programme has met some elite-level political resistance, popular resistance has been lim-
ited, not least because, unlike means-tested welfare schemes, it included all citizens.68
Higher energy prices would help reduce energy consumption both through immediate 
price effects and by providing longer-term incentives to choose more energy-efficient tech-
nology and lifestyles. Drawing on panel data of 66 countries, Charap et al. estimate a 
long-term price elasticity of energy consumption of 0.3 to 0.5.69 This indicates consid-
erable energy savings potential in HRCs: on the modest assumption that HRC energy 
prices could be doubled, consumption would decrease by between 19 and 29 percent given 
Charap et al.’s elasticity estimates.
Less consumption would both reduce negative environmental externalities and help HRCs 
to preserve hydrocarbons export capacity (or at least reduce their need to maintain expen-
sive extra production capacity), thereby helping finance the cash grants. Given the highly 
skewed distribution of energy consumption and the typically larger utility of cash than of 
subsidies in kind, it should be possible to improve the material situation of the vast majority 
of citizens on a fiscally neutral basis. The large elasticity estimates also show that technol-
ogy choices react strongly to price signals; HRCs would hence be likely to leave the path of 
declining energy efficiency and move away from subsidy-dependent production.
Wealth Accounts’. Chang-Tai Hsieh, ‘Do Consumers React to Anticipated Income Changes? Evi-
dence from the Alaska Permanent Fund’, American Economic Review 93/1 (2003), pp. 397–405.
66  The average HRC score for the World Bank’s ‘Control of Corruption’ indicator is close to the global 
average of 0, while the average for MRCs is −0.9, almost a standard deviation below the average.
67  Benedict Clements et al., ‘Case Studies’. As recent riots in Nigeria have shown, increasing energy 
prices without compensatory measures can be politically risky; see Adam Nossiter, ‘Under Pressure, 
Nigerian President Relents on Gas Price’, New York Times, 16 January 2012. Available at http://www.
nytimes.com/2012/01/17/world/africa/nigerian-president-rolls-back-price-of-gasoline.html (accessed 
13 October 2015).
68  Benedict Clements et al., ‘Case Studies’, pp. 30f. Tabatabai, ‘‘Basic Income’ Road’. The Iranian 
programme is somewhat different from the citizens’ income proposed here as the former’s grants are 
paid to heads of household rather than individuals, giving it a patriarchal bias.
69  Charap et al., Energy Subsidies.
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Labour Markets
The rationale and impact of providing an HRC citizens’ income in return for reduced 
public sector employment are somewhat more complex, but of potentially even larger 
developmental import. As explained above, public sector over-employment is a costly 
and inequitable tool of wealth distribution, undermines government effectiveness and has 
resulted in the exclusion of HRC citizens from the private labour market, which is typically 
dominated by cheap migrant labour and characterised by declining labour productivity.
Creating a citizens’ income in return for more selective public sector employment could 
help mitigate all of these issues. As we will see, arguments from the general basic income 
literature are more relevant than those of the rentier cash grants debate, and are particu-
larly applicable in the HRC context.
How would public sector employment be reduced? In practice, it could prove difficult to 
dismiss significant numbers of the existing stock of public employees (even if they received 
a cash grant guarantee in return), but the grants could be used to justify much more selec-
tive and needs-based future recruitment. It should be easier to persuade future labour 
market entrants to exchange the more or less vague hope of future public employment 
for a concrete and lifelong – if more modest – entitlement. For incumbent public sector 
employees, the citizens’ income should be incorporated into their existing salaries – which 
de facto already include a strong rent-sharing component – rather than paid on top of 
them, to avoid making (scarcer) government employment even more attractive.
The delinking of public employment and rent distribution would make wealth sharing 
broader, less exclusive, less discretionary and much less distortionary in terms of labour 
market incentives. Incentives provided by a citizens’ income would be very likely to increase 
citizens’ private employment. Due to the reduction in public jobs and the cash grant’s 
income effect, its net effect on citizens’ total labour market participation is ambiguous; if 
higher participation is taken as a policy objective, further complementary policies would 
be necessary, particularly among HRCs with very high rents.
Under unconditional cash grants, citizens would not have to take on idle, often unreward-
ing government jobs to share in the country’s wealth but would be free to pursue their 
own preferences, including on the private labour market. Although the size of the private 
employment effect is hard to estimate and would depend on grant level as well as prevail-
ing wage levels, it appears clear that with prospects of an easy public job more remote, at 
least some citizens would seek other sources of work income.
In this context, the citizens’ income would function somewhat analogously to an uncondi-
tional wage subsidy.70 Nationals could achieve acceptable total income levels even if holding 
less well-paid jobs than currently, as their citizens’ income would top up their private sector 
wages without penalty. It would allow them to compete in lower-wage labour market seg-
ments currently dominated by migrant workers. Incentives to perform would be stronger, 
as the public sector’s low effort benchmark would be more remote.
Private jobs would also become more attractive compared to government employment as the 
70  Not strictly analogously, as wage subsidies are only paid when an individual is in paid employment.
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wage gap between the two would be narrowed by the amount of the citizens’ income. The 
greater attractiveness of private employment would also incentivise nationals to seek educa-
tion and skills that are relevant in the private economy and which HRC citizens often lack.
Due to its secure nature, a citizens’ income would also give job seekers a better bargain-
ing position vis-à-vis employers than conditional benefits schemes, leading to better job 
market matching and potentially higher wages. A citizens’ income would provide ‘the 
administrative security which will enable many people to take the risk of accepting a job or 
creating their own’,71 raising the level of citizen entrepreneurship, which typically is very 
low in HRCs.
It would also function as a quasi ‘study grant’ allowing nationals to drop out of the labour 
market occasionally or reduce work engagements to acquire new skills, leading to ‘signifi-
cantly more stepping-stone, training-intensive, often part-time jobs’,72 thereby improving 
human capital accumulation, a particularly grave concern in HRCs. Conversely, secure 
cash grants could make hiring and firing nationals less socially and politically problem-
atic, thereby bringing citizen employment closer to the flexibility that employers currently 
enjoy with migrant workers.73
Economist James Meade has made the argument that a citizens’ income in Western econ-
omies would allow full employment without exposing low earners to unacceptably low 
total incomes.74 It is noteworthy that he argued for such a policy in a context in which 
implementation would be fiscally vastly more complex – and in which the need for income 
supplements for private employees is much less urgent, as most private sector wages in the 
West are much higher than in HRCs, despite similar levels of overall wealth.75
Compared to a hypothetical (and unrealistic) scenario of no wealth sharing at all, the cit-
izens’ income would reduce citizens’ private labour supply through a pure income effect.76 
71  Philippe Van Parijs, ‘Basic Income and the Two Dilemmas of the Welfare State’, Political Quarterly 
67/1 (1996), pp. 63–6.
72  Philippe Van Parijs and Claudio Salinas, ‘Basic Income and its Cognates: Puzzling Equivalence 
and Unheeded Differences between Alternative Ways of Addressing the ‘New Social Question’ 
(Louvain, 1998). Van Parijs, ‘Basic Income and the Two Dilemmas’, p. 65.
73  Hertog, ‘Comparative Assessment’.
74  James Edward Meade, Full Employment Regained? (Cambridge, 1996).
75  The above arguments apply less clearly to Equatorial Guinea, where civil service employment 
is limited and hence unlikely to serve as a benchmark for citizens’ labour market behaviour. The 
positive labour market effects of a citizens’ income would accordingly be smaller, and the scheme 
might lead citizens to drop out of the market altogether. Given Equatorial Guinea’s small formal 
economy and severe poverty, cash grants would, however, be likely to have a stronger positive impact 
on improving basic livelihood as well as micro-entrepreneurship, as they have had in other under-
developed countries.
76  Some experimental studies in the West have shown that income maintenance schemes have a 
modest negative effect on the working hours of beneficiaries. Some of this modest effect appears to 
be due to rising marginal taxes (i.e. a substitution effect), which would not apply in HRCs. See Alice 
H. Munnell, ‘Lessons from the Income Maintenance Experiments: Proceedings of a Conference 
Held at Melvin Village’, Federal Reserve Bank of Boston Conference Series 30 (September 1986). Avail-
able at http://econpapers.repec.org/article/fipfedbcp/y_3a1987_3ai_3asep_3an_3a30.htm (accessed 
13 October 2015). See also Karl Widerquist, ‘The Bottom Line in a Basic Income Experiment’, Basic 
Steffen Hertog 31 
It does potentially give recipients the option not to work at all, especially if it is set at a 
high level compared to available private salaries – a scenario that is more likely (or fea-
sible) among very rich HRCs like Brunei, Kuwait, Qatar and the UAE. Even then, work 
disincentives are less strong than with conventional means-tested support mechanisms, as 
unconditional grants would avoid the substitution (or ‘tax’) effects of unemployment assis-
tance or insurance and other forms of conditional income support, where benefits are lost 
as work is found and/or wages increase.77
A case can be made that choosing not to work because one is born wealthy can be a per-
fectly rational and optimal decision resulting from a widened choice set, superior to forcing 
citizens into meaningless jobs as a condition of rent sharing. If we take citizens’ higher 
labour market participation in productive jobs as a social objective, however, complemen-
tary reforms aimed at improving private wages would be likely to be necessary. These can 
only be briefly adumbrated here. They should, however, include improvement in migrants’ 
rights, notably through allowing them mobility between employers, which would improve 
migrants’ bargaining position, thereby increasing prevailing wages.78 Targeted wage subsi-
dies could also be considered. 
Migration reform would be politically and economically easier to undertake if more skilled 
national labour were available to start with – which citizens’ income and public employ-
ment reform would contribute to. They would be likely to result in better albeit fewer jobs 
for migrants from poor countries – a trade-off that would result from any serious migrant 
rights reform, on which there seems to be widespread international consensus.
Macro-Economic Implications
We have already alluded to some of the macro-economic effects that a cash grant scheme 
combined with public sector reform could have: more nationals, with typically higher skills 
than migrants, would join the private labour market and the market for entrepreneurship; 
national human resources would be better formed and utilised, which would be likely to 
lead to higher levels of production and productivity. Businesses themselves would have 
incentives for productivity enhancements to make better use of a higher-skilled labour 
force. Complementary migration reform could reduce incentives to rely on (and exploit) 
Income Studies 1/2 (2006), pp. 1–5. More recent pilot projects in developing countries – in admittedly 
quite different socio-economic contexts – have shown no effect on or increases in economic activity 
among recipients of a basic income. See ‘Basic Income Grant Coalition, Towards a Basic Income 
Grant for All!’ Basic Income Grant Pilot Project Assessment Report, September 2008. Available at www.
bignam.org/Publications/BIG_Assessment_report_08a.pdf (accessed 13 October 2015). See also Gelb 
and Majerowicz, Oil for Uganda; Segal, ‘Resource Rents’. In any case, the income effect for more 
productive workers with higher earnings will be smaller, as the grants will constitute a smaller part of 
their overall income, further tempering its aggregate impact. See Segal, ‘Resource Rents’.
77  Widerquist and Lewis, Basic Income Guarantee. Targeted subsidies for low-wage workers (like the 
Earned Income Tax Credit in the US) would have similar, if weaker, disincentive effects relative to 
the citizens’ income, reducing work effort and incentives to upgrade one’s skills.
78  Suresh Naidu, Yaw Nyarko and Shing-Yi Wang, ‘Worker Mobility in a Global Labor Market: Evi-
dence from the United Arab Emirates’, NBER Working Paper 20388 (August 2014). Available at http://
www.nber.org/papers/w20388 (accessed 23 October 2015).
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low-skilled foreign workers, further motivating businesses to invest in technology and pro-
cesses that can use better-skilled workers.
Stronger private labour market participation of nationals would also increase privately 
generated domestic demand, as a larger share of private earnings would remain in the 
local economy, thereby reducing the economy’s reliance on state spending. The more even 
income distribution achieved through cash grants would probably also lead to demand 
growth, as poorer households, which would disproportionately benefit, have a higher pro-
pensity to consume.
Political Economy Consequences
In line with the predictions of the rentier cash grant literature, a citizens’ income could put 
state–society relations on a more equal footing, giving more autonomy and imparting a 
sense of equality to HRC citizens. The effect could be even stronger than in MRCs because 
in HRCs the client status of citizens tends to be particularly pronounced, as state depen-
dence and reliance on discretionary patronage, including through public employment, are 
so widespread. Stronger participation in the private labour market under decent income 
conditions and more widespread entrepreneurship could accelerate the formation of the 
modern middle class that HRCs by and large lack.
This middle class would develop a vested interest in private-driven growth, paving the way 
for a potential class compromise with local capital and for stronger demand for industrial, 
regulatory and educational policies that could undergird the private-driven diversification 
that HRCs urgently need. Such class compromise would mitigate the vertical divisions and 
zero-sum conflicts that currently characterise HRC political economies, in which business 
and citizenry tend to be separate and rival clients in a hub-and-spoke system organised 
around the distributional state.
Addressing Counter-Arguments
There are many potential counter-arguments to cash grant schemes, both from the general 
basic income literature and from the literature on rentier cash grants in particular. The 
following section will address both in turn, showing that neither set of arguments applies 
to HRCs.
Counter-Arguments from the Basic Income Literature
The most prominent arguments against ‘basic income’ schemes relate to tax rates, labour 
market incentives and redistribution.79 A basic income in the West, as well as in lower-rent 
countries under at least some proposals,80 would require significantly higher tax rates on 
middle to high earners, which could lead to battles over redistribution and reduced polit-
79  See Van Parjis, ‘Basic Income: A Simple and Powerful Idea’, for an overview.
80  Sandbu, ‘Natural Wealth Accounts’. Segal, ‘Resource Rents’.
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ical feasibility – one main drawback of basic income schemes compared to other policies.81 
In rentier countries, by contrast, the basic challenge is not how to raise revenue and from 
whom, but rather how to distribute the existing rent that accrues from outside of the local 
economy.82 HRC fiscal policy is by definition a voluntarist regime that is forced to make 
decisions on allocation; there is no (immediate) need to build up and justify the extraction 
of resources from the richer strata of society.
Globalisation is also seen as a challenge to basic income schemes, as high taxes could drive 
capital and highly qualified labour out of the country; another issue that does not apply to 
HRCs.83 To avoid the politics of taxation, Van Parijs and Salinas in fact consider the creation 
of a basic income from some common asset among advanced economies, but concede that 
this would be likely not to yield enough revenue.84 In HRCs, by contrast, it certainly would.
A citizens’ income in tax-based systems would potentially decrease work incentives for 
mid and high earners.85 A basic income implies a ‘principled though partial disconnection 
between labour and income’.86 This again is not the case for HRCs, at least as far as produc-
tive work is concerned: as we have argued above, a well-designed citizens’ income would 
in fact substantially increase private sector work incentives for HRC nationals compared to 
the status quo.
Closely related, the moral argument that a citizens’ income creates a system of free riders 
clinging to the coat-tail of taxpayers does not apply in the HRC scenario.87 Critics of basic 
income schemes in the West paint a gloomy picture of an army of idle or near-idle citizens 
living off state-provided payments. In most HRCs, however, the idle armies already exist 
– including significant parts of the public sector – and are supported in very inequitable 
ways. There would be fewer of them under a citizens’ income.
We have mentioned above that a citizens’ income would have an income effect, which could 
potentially reduce citizens’ desired work hours compared to a hypothetical scenario of 
radical austerity (and, in the status quo scenario, for the small number of nationals already 
privately employed). It is, however, not clear whether maximising individuals’ hours of 
work is really a socially desirable goal.88 This is especially the case in HRCs: as we have 
seen above, there is currently a shortage of reasonably paid private sector work for HRC 
nationals; spreading the available jobs across a broader population with shorter working 
81  Van Parijs and Salinas, Basic Income and its Cognates.
82  Paul Segal, ‘How to Spend It: Resource Wealth and the Distribution of Resource Rents’, Energy 
Policy 51 (2012), pp. 340–8.
83  Philippe Van Parijs and Yannick Vanderborght, ‘Basic Income in a Globalized Economy’, in 
Brigid Reynolds and Seán Healy (eds), Does the European Social Model Have a Future? (Dublin, 2012).
84  Van Parijs and Salinas, Basic Income and its Cognates.
85  Van Parjis, ‘Basic Income: A Simple and Powerful Idea’, p. 15. Widerquist and Lewis, Basic Income 
Guarantee. Note that a higher marginal tax on earnings does not necessarily mean less net income, as 
every citizen receives an untaxed basic income in addition to her private income. Low-to-mid earners 
might hence be better off materially although potentially working less due a combination of income 
effect and tax rate effect.
86  Van Parjis, ‘Basic Income and the Two Dilemmas’, p. 64.
87  Philippe Van Parijs, ‘Free Riding versus Rent Sharing’, in F. Farina, F. Hahn and S. Vanucci (eds), 
Ethics, Rationality and Economic Behaviour (London, 1996).
88  Segal, How to Spend It, pp. 484f.
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hours might be a good idea. While in tax-based production states, more work effort tends 
to beget a growing economy and more work opportunities, this link is less strong in HRCs, 
where much growth and demand will remain driven by exogenous rents for a long time. 
Basic income proponents have made the argument for cash grants as a ‘soft strategy for job 
sharing’,89 a particularly relevant point for small HRC labour markets.
Counter-Arguments from the Rentier Cash Grant Literature
The literature on cash grants in conventional rentier states also (both implicitly and 
explicitly) points to a number of potential weaknesses of such schemes. Many authors, for 
example, assume that individuals will use cash more smartly than governments. A citizens’ 
income in HRCs does not necessarily require this assumption, as its objective of incentiv-
ising citizens to join the private labour market would obtain independently of how citizens 
spent their grants. As important, HRC cash grants could be financed through subsidy 
reforms and reduced public sector recruitment, thereby attacking particularly inefficient 
ways of using public resources. Closely related, the argument that cash grants could ‘deny 
a cash strapped government the opportunity of improving the delivery of its services to its 
citizens’90 or deny such a government the opportunity to build critical infrastructure91 is 
not relevant to HRCs, whose delivery of public services and infrastructure spending could 
remain untouched as surplus public sector employment is reduced.
Similarly, at least some variants of the rentier cash grant proposal assume that distribut-
ing rents through cash grants will require governments to raise taxes to pay for hitherto 
rent-financed activities.92 While creating a broad-based tax system is a worthwhile long-
term objective for HRCs too, it is not a necessary requirement for the creation of a citizens’ 
income. This drastically increases the latter’s political and administrative feasibility.
Many of the supporting arguments for rentier cash grants – such as the developmental 
utility of building taxation capacity, and the creation of a sense of citizen ownership that 
leads to enforcement of transparency and governance93 – are not required for the citizens’ 
income to make sense in HRCs, where it also stands on other merits.
A final critique of rentier cash grants in the literature is that they might not be admin-
istratively feasible in weak states.94 There are general counter-arguments to this: many 
low-capacity administrations have rolled out wide-ranging systems of cash transfers using 
new technologies such as biometric identification, smartcards and payments into mobile bank 
89  Van Parijs, ‘Basic Income and the Two Dilemmas’, p. 64.
90  Giorgio Brosio, ‘Bypassing Government: Oil Related Conditional Cash Transfers’, prepared for 
presentation at the 24th Annual Meeting of the Società di Economia Pubblica, Pavia, 24 and 25 Sep-
tember 2012, p. 9.
91  Gelb and Majerowicz, Oil for Uganda, p. 9.
92  Birdsall and Subramanian, ‘Saving Iraq’. Gillies, Giving Money Away?. Sandbu, ‘Natural Wealth 
Accounts’. Segal, ‘Resource Rents’.
93  These are critiqued in Brosio, ‘Bypassing Government’.
94  Michael Ross, ‘How Mineral-Rich States Can Reduce Inequality’, in Macartan Humphreys, Jeffrey 
D. Sachs and Joseph E. Stiglitz (eds), Escaping the Resource Curse (New York, 2007).
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accounts.95 In any case, with the exception of Equatorial Guinea and to some extent Gabon, 
HRCs generally have stronger administrative capacity than low- to mid-rent countries.96
Two more counter-arguments not present in the literature are worth considering. First, 
one potential danger of creating a citizens’ income is that it might in the future again be 
complemented by other, less efficient methods of rent circulation. This is why the simul-
taneous implementation of cash grants and of subsidy and public employment reforms is 
crucial, and why public awareness of this quid pro quo probably needs to be built before 
any reforms. It might be difficult to prevent inefficient patronage from seeping back into 
the system later on, but expanding patronage would be even more likely under a contin-
uation of the status quo scenario. A citizens’ income would almost certainly allow a clearer 
and more effective stance warding off demands for future mass patronage than is possible 
under the current distributional setup.
Secondly, HRC rulers might just be so self-interested and politically autonomous as to 
avoid almost any meaningful distribution to the population, thereby making them unin-
terested in equity and efficiency of distribution. This seems to be the case in Equatorial 
Guinea.97 This problem, however, is not specific to the citizens’ income idea: in such cases, 
no policy prescription about how resources should best be used is of immediate practical 
relevance, and one might have to wait for a ruler’s survival or intended legacy to become 
contingent on the welfare of his population.
If an HRC regime has any interest in better resource allocation, a citizens’ income should 
in principle be politically feasible, as it would create many more winners than losers. Gil-
lies, moreover, has argued that ‘the costs of allocating revenues to citizens will be lower 
if the leader enjoys some autonomy from inter-factional political competition and if the 
resource rent is sustainably large’.98 The former is the case in all HRCs, the latter arguably 
in most of them, as they are typically small, authoritarian and centralised, and face low 
levels of political mobilisation in society.
Policy Design and Feasibility
A detailed discussion of a citizens’ income’s practical policy design is a subject for future 
work, but we will nevertheless venture some preliminary observations on grant level, tran-
sition arrangements and financing, which are critical for labour market impact and for 
political and fiscal feasibility.
The level of the citizens’ income should ideally be fixed quasi-permanently or at least 
for a considerable period, the latter possibly by tying it to a long-term moving average 
of resource income (or subsidy savings). Only in this way will consistent labour market 
planning be possible for both government and individuals; for the scheme to have its full 
incentive effects, HRC citizens need a constant, predictable income stream.99 At the same 
95  Gelb and Majerowicz, Oil for Uganda. Moss, Oil to Cash. Segal, ‘Resource Rents’.
96  See n. 38.
97  Antony Goldman, Poverty and Poor Governance in the Land of Plenty: Assessing an Oil Dividend in 
Equatorial Guinea, Oil-to-Cash Initiative Background Paper (Washington, DC, 2011).
98  Gillies, Giving Money Away?, p. 16.
99  Against this background, a recent proposal of one-off grants for citizens once they reach maturity 
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time, the scheme might have to be phased in gradually, at least if it is to be financed by 
subsidy reductions which in turn need to be undertaken in an orderly fashion to allow 
households and businesses to adjust to new prices. Energy subsidy reforms should also 
be gradual, to allow the wages of migrants to catch up with the resulting cost-of-living 
increases – which in turn would be facilitated too by an improvement in migrant workers’ 
labour rights.100
The financing options for a citizens’ income could vary from case to case. Detailed coun-
try-by-country estimates are beyond the scope of this paper. To give a sense of the possible 
magnitudes involved, however, Table 3 shows the estimated size of a monthly cash grant, 
for all adults aged 20 and older who are not employed in government, that could be 
financed through the complete removal of energy subsidies as estimated by the IMF for 
2011.101 Figures are particularly high in countries with large foreign populations.
Table 3. Monthly Citizens’ Incomes Financed by Removal of Pre-Tax Energy Subsi-
dies, 2011 (USD). 
Source: Based on IMF and World Bank data, various national reports.
Country Income
Bahrain 1141
Brunei 411
Equatorial Guinea 26
Gabon 8
Kuwait 4642
Libya 290
Oman 394
Qatar 10072
Saudi Arabia 924
Trinidad and Tobago 77
UAE 5811
appears only a second-best solution. See Giacomo Corneo, ‘Stakeholding as a New Development 
Strategy for Saudi Arabia’, Review of Middle East Economics and Finance 7/1 (2011), pp. 1–19.
100  Governments could also consider providing subsidised energy for small households, i.e. up to a 
certain (low) monthly level of consumption. The inclusion of migrants in this arrangement might, 
however, be politically hard to justify.
101  The assumption is that any energy not used domestically as a result of higher prices could be 
exported internationally. At least in the short run, this will not be the case for large exporters like 
Saudi Arabia; the figures are hence upper-boundary estimates.
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In some cases, the grant level would be more than enough to bridge the gaps between 
citizen wages in the public sector, citizen wages in the private sector and migrant wages 
in the private sector. In Saudi Arabia, for example, average citizen wages in 2010 were 
USD 1,900 in government and 1,000 in the private sector, while (typically less-educated) 
migrant workers earned an average of USD 300 in the private market. The estimated cash 
grant of more than USD 900 would easily bridge both gaps – if anything, it would be too 
generous, making at least low-skilled Saudi citizens prefer inactivity to private employment 
unless complementary labour reforms, as outlined above, served to increase the general 
wage level on the private market.
In other cases, complementary sources of finance would be needed for a citizens’ income 
to have meaningful welfare and incentive effects. Savings on reduced public sector hiring 
would only kick in over a longer period, meaning that a substantial citizens’ income would 
initially imply additional spending – which current hydrocarbons prices, government 
reserves and returns on overseas assets would easily allow.102
In the very long run, the citizens’ income could potentially be financed entirely out of returns 
on HRCs’ sovereign wealth, and thereby be turned into a permanent revenue stream. Such 
a scheme has again been proposed for financing basic income provisions in advanced econ-
omies,103 but would be much more substantial and more easily justified in HRCs.
Conclusion and Outlook
The ambition of this paper has been twofold: first, to document patterns of resource dis-
tribution in HRCs and their distinct developmental consequences, which put HRCs into a 
class of their own within the rentier state universe; and second, to propose cash grants in 
combination with energy subsidy and public employment reform as a mitigation strategy to 
minimise the negative impact of rent distribution in HRCs. These policies would improve 
resource efficiency and productivity, enable entrepreneurship, help to integrate nationals 
into the private labour market without exposing them to socially unacceptable income 
levels, facilitate political compromise between social classes, and help put HRCs onto a 
fiscally sustainable path.
Much further work is required on country-level policy design and quantitative estimates 
of the impact of different policy packages. The implications of and justifications for a cit-
izens’ income will differ somewhat from case to case, but arguments in favour are always 
strong: this paper’s new, HRC-specific arguments are most applicable to HRCs with both 
large subsidies and public employment (Brunei, Libya and the Gulf monarchies). For the 
other cases, a different mix of rationales applies, including the existing arguments from the 
broader cash grants literature, many of the counter-arguments to which are less pertinent 
102  In Gabon and Equatorial Guinea in particular – countries with low energy subsidies, relatively 
small government sectors and comparatively limited overseas assets – a citizens’ income might have 
to be part-financed through an earmarked portion of regular resource revenue.
103 Karl Widerquist, ‘An Introduction to Citizens Capital Accounts’, in Miriam Kennet (ed.), Pro-
ceedings of the Green Economics Conference: Social Aspects of Green Economics, Green Economics Institute, 
(Oxford, 2008). Available at http://works.bepress.com/widerquist/15 (accessed 13 October 2015).
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in the case of HRCs. In the case of Equatorial Guinea and Gabon in particular, cash grants 
can be justified with weak governance and limited capacity to make good public use of 
resources, and the fact that relative abundance lessens concerns over having to cut govern-
ment programmes or to create a broad-based taxation system immediately.
Quite apart from future research on HRCs themselves, their conceptualisation as a distinct 
category raises important questions for the broader resource curse literature: due to their 
large resource income, these cases are likely to have an outsize importance for many of the 
statistical studies in that literature. This paper has shown that the characteristics and mal-
adies of mid-rent and high-rent countries might be quite distinct; conflating the two could 
hence easily lead to invalid conclusions. Investigating the extent to which existing results 
might be driven by distinct subsets of resource-rich countries is hence another important 
avenue of future research. 
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